Abstract. Computational indistinguishability is a notion in complexity-theoretic cryptography and is used to define many security criteria. However, in traditional cryptography, proving computational indistinguishability is usually informal and becomes error-prone when cryptographic constructions are complex. This paper presents a formal proof system based on an extension of Hofmann's SLR language, which can capture probabilistic polynomial-time computations through typing and is sufficient for expressing cryptographic constructions. We in particular define rules that justify directly the computational indistinguishability between programs and prove that these rules are sound with respect to the set-theoretic semantics, hence the standard definition of security. We also show that it is applicable in cryptography by verifying, in our proof system, Goldreich and Micali's construction of pseudorandom generator, and the equivalence between next-bit unpredictability and pseudorandomness.
Introduction
Research on the formal verification of cryptographic protocols in recent years has switched its focus from the Dolev-Yao model to the computational model -a more realistic model where criteria for the underlying cryptography are considered. Computational indistinguishability is an important notion in cryptography and the computational model of protocols, which is particularly used to define many security criteria. However, proving computational indistinguishability in traditional cryptography is usually done in a paper-and-pencil, semi-formal way. It is often error-prone and becomes unreliable when the cryptographic constructions are complex. This paper aims at designing a formal system that can help us to verify cryptographic proofs. Our ultra goal will be fully or partially automating the verification.
Noticing that computational indistinguishability can be seen as a special notion of equivalence between programs, we make use of techniques from the theory of programming languages, but this requires in the first place a proper language for expressing cryptographic constructions and adversaries. In particular, we shall consider only "feasible" adversaries, precisely, probabilistic programs that terminate within polynomial time. While such a complexity restriction can be easily formulated using the model of Turing-machines, it is by no mean a good model for formal verification. At this point, our attention is drawn to Hofmann's SLR system [7, 8] , a functional programming language that implements Bellantoni and Cook's safe recursion [3] . The very nice property about SLR is the characterization of polynomialtime computations through typing. The probabilistic extension of SLR has been studied by Mitchell et al. [10] , where functions of the proper type capture the computations that terminate in polynomial time on a probabilistic Turing machine.
Our system is based on the probabilistic extension of SLR, and we develop an axiomatization system with rules justifying the computational indistinguishability between programs. We prove that these rules are sound with respect to the set-theoretic semantics of the language, hence coincide with the traditional definition of computational indistinguishability. Reasoning about cryptographic constructions in the proof system is then purely syntactic, without explicit analysis on the probability of program output and the complexity bound of adversaries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the computational SLR -a probabilistic extension of Hofmann's SLR, together with an adapted definition of computational indistinguishability based on the language. In Section 3 we develop the equational proof system and prove the soundness of its rules. Cryptographic examples using the proof system are given in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes related work and Section 6 concludes the paper.
The computational SLR
We start by define a language for expressing cryptographic constructions and adversaries, as well as the computational indistinguishability between programs. Due to the complexity consideration, the language should offer a mechanism to capture the class of probabilistic polynomial-time computations. Bellantoni and Cook have proposed a recursion model other than the model of Turing-machines, which is called safe recursion and defines exactly functions that are computable in polynomial-time on a Turing-machine [3] . This is an intrinsic, purely syntactic mechanism: variables are divided into two classes -safe variables and normal variables, and safe variables must be instantiated by values that are computed using only safe variables; recursion must take place on normal variables and intermediate recursion results are never sent to safe variables. When higher-order functions are concerned, it is also required that step functions must be linear, i.e., intermediate recursive results can be used only once in each step.
Hofmann later developed a functional language called SLR to implement the safe recursion [7, 8] . In particular, he introduces a type system with modality to distinguish between normal variables and safe variables, and linearity to distinguish between normal functions and linear functions. He proves that well-typed functions of a proper type are exactly polynomial-time computable functions. Hofmann's original SLR system has a polymorphic type system, but it is not necessary in cryptography, so in this section we first introduce a non-polymorphic version of Hofmann's SLR system, then extend it to express cryptographic constructions. We shall adapt the definition of the computational indistinguishability in our language.
The non-polymorphic SLR for bitstrings
Types are defined by:
Bits is the base type for bitstrings, and all other types are from Hofmann's language: τ × τ are cartesian product types, and τ ⊗ τ are tensor product types as in linear λ-calculus. There are three sorts of functions: τ → τ are modal functions with no restriction on the use of arguments; τ → τ are non-modal functions where arguments must be safe values; τ τ are linear functions where arguments can be used only once. We also use the aspects of SLR to represent these function spaces -τ a − → τ is a function type with aspect a, which is (modal, nonlinear) (noted as m) for τ → τ , (nonmodal, nonlinear) (noted as n) for τ → τ and (nonmodal, linear) (noted as l) for τ τ . The aspects are ordered by m ≤ n ≤ l.
The type system also inherits the sub-typing from SLR and we write τ <: τ if τ is a sub-type of τ . The sub-typing rules are listed in Figure 1 . Note that the last rule, from which we can have Bits → τ <: Bits τ , states that bitstrings can be duplicated without violating linearity. Expressions of SLR are defined by the following grammar: tensor product | let x ⊗ y = e 1 in e 2 tensor projection B 0 and B 1 are two constants for constructing bitstrings: if u is a bitstring, B 0 u (or B 1 u) is the new bitstring with a bit 0 (or 1) added at the left end of u. We often use B to denote the bit constructor when its value is irrelevant. Note that in this language we work on real bitstrings, not the number that they represent. For instance, 0 and 00 are two different objects in our language, so the two constants B 0 and B 1 are different from the two successors S 0 and S 1 in Hofmann's system. case τ is the constant for case distinction: case τ (n, e, f 0 , f 1 ) tests the bitstring n and returns e if n is an empty bitstring, f 0 (n ) if the first bit of n is 0 and the rest is n , and f 1 (n ) if the first bit of n is 1. rec τ is the constant for recursion on bitstrings: rec τ (e, f, n) returns e if n is empty, and f (n , rec τ (e, f, n )) otherwise, where n is the part of the bitstring n with its first bit cut off. Typing assertions of expressions are of the form Γ t : τ , where Γ is a typing context that assigns types and aspects to variables. A context is typically written as a list of bindings x 1 : a 1 τ 1 , . . . , x n : an τ n , where a 1 , . . . a n are aspects of {m, n, l}. Typing rules are given in Figure 2 .
The computational SLR
The probabilistic extension of SLR is studied by Mitchell et al. by adding a random bit oracle to simulate the oracle tape in probabilistic Turing-machines [10] . However, in their language, there is no explicit distinction between probabilistic and purely deterministic functions, so we adopt a different type system from Moggi's computational λ-calculus [12] , where probabilistic computations are captured by monadic types. We call the language computational SLR and often abbreviate it as CSLR.
Types in CSLR are extended with a unary type constructor:
It comes from Moggi's language: a type Tτ is called a monadic type (or a computation type), for computations that return (if they terminate correctly) values of type τ . In our case, a computation always terminates and can be probabilistic, hence it will return one of a set of values, each with a certain probability. The sub-typing system is then extended with the rule:
Expressions of the computational SLR are extended with three constructions for probabilistic computations: e 1 , e 2 , . . . ::= . . .
SLR terms
The constant rand returns a random bit 0 or 1, each with the probability 1 2 . val(e) is the trivial (deterministic) computation which returns e with the probability 1. bind x = e 1 in e 2 is the sequential computation which first computes e 1 , binds the value to x, then computes e 2 . We sometimes abbreviate the program of the form bind x 1 = e 1 in . . . bind x n = e n in e as bind ( x 1 = e 1 , . . . , x n = e n ) in e.
Note that the order of some bindings must be carefully kept in the abbreviated form. Typing rules for these extra constants and constructions are given in Figure 3 . Note that when defining a purely deterministic program in CSLR, it is not sufficient to state that their types does not have monadic components. For instance, the function λx Bits . (λy TBits . x)rand has type Bits Bits, but it still contains probabilistic computations. Instead, we must show that the program can be defined and typed in (non-probabilistic) SLR, and in that case, we say it is SLR-definable and SLR-typable. As in some standard typed λ-calculi, we can define a reduction system for the computational SLR, and prove that every closed term has a canonical form. In particular, the canonical form of type Bits is:
If u is a closed term of type Bits, we write |u| for its length. We define the length of a bitstring on its canonical form b:
A set-theoretic semantics
We write B for the set of bitstrings, with a special element denoting the empty bitstring. When u, v are bitstrings, we write u · v for their concatenation. If A, B are sets, we write A × B and A → B for their cartesian product and function space. To interpret the probabilistic computations, we adopt the probabilistic monad defined in [14] : if A is set, we write D A : A → [0, 1] for the set of probability mass functions over A. The original monad in [14] is defined using measures instead of mass functions, and is of type
, where 2 A denotes the set of all subsets of A, so that it can also represent computing probabilities over infinite data structure, not just discrete probabilities. But for the sake of simplicity, in this paper we work on mass functions instead of measures. Note that the monad is not the one defined in [10] , which is used to keep track of the bits read from the oracle tape rather than reasoning about probabilities. When d is a mass function of D A and a ∈ A, we also write Pr[a ← d] for the probability d(a). If there are finitely many elements in d ∈ D A , we can write d as {(a 1 , p 1 ), . . . , (a n , p n )}, where a i ∈ A and
The detailed definition of the set-theoretic semantics is given in Figure 4 . The very nice property of SLR is the characterization of polynomial-time computations (the class PTIME) through typing:
Theorem 1 (Hofmann [8] ). The set-theoretic interpretations of closed terms of type Bits → Bits in SLR define exactly polynomial-time computable functions.
Mitchell et al. have extended Hofmann's result to the probabilistic version of SLR with a random bit oracle, showing that terms of the same type in their language define exactly the functions that can be computed by a probabilistic Turing machine in polynomial time (the class PPT). Although our language is slightly different from their language OSLR (which does not have computation types), the categorical Interpretation of types:
Interpretation of terms:
proj i e ρ = vi, where e ρ = (v1, v2)
where τ is the type of the variable x (or Tτ is the type of e1). Fig. 4 . The set-theoretic semantics for the computational SLR model that they use to prove the above result can be also used to interpret the computational SLR. In particular, if we follow the traditional encoding of call-by-value λ-calculus into Moggi's computational language, function types τ a − → τ in OSLR will be encoded as τ a − → Tτ in CSLR, hence OSLR functions that correspond to PPT computations are actually CSLR functions of type Bits → TBits. This permits us to reuse the result of [10] , adapted for the computational SLR:
Theorem 2 (Mitchell et al. [10] ). The set-theoretic interpretations of closed terms of type Bits → TBits in CSLR define exactly functions that can be computed by a probabilistic Turing machine in polynomial time.
Computational indistinguishability
We say that a closed SLR-term p (of type Bits → Bits) is length-sensitive if for every two bitstrings u 1 , u 2 of the same length, i.e. |u 1 | = |u 2 |, it holds that |p(u 1 )| = |p(u 2 )|. When a term p is lengthsensitive, we write |p| for the underlying length measure function, i.e., |p|(n) = |p(u)|, where |u| = n. If p and q are two length-sensitive SLR-functions, we write |p| < |q| for the fact that for all bitstring u, |p(u)| < |q(u)|, and similar for |p| > |q|, |p| = |q|, etc. A length-sensitive function is said positive if for every bitstring u, |p(u)| > |u|.
We say that a closed CSLR-term p (of type Bits → τ ) is numerical if its value depends only on the length of its argument, i.e., p(u 1 ) = p(u 2 ) if |u 1 | = |u 2 |. Note that we do not introduce the standard numerical functions in the language, so the numerical and length-sensitive SLR-functions will be used to represent the usual polynomials of numerals, and we often abbreviate them as polynomials. A numerical polynomial is canonical if it returns empty bitstring or all-1 bitstrings only.
Intuitively, two probabilistic functions are computationally indistinguishable, if the probability that any feasible adversary can distinguish them becomes negligible when they take sufficiently large arguments. We adapt the definition of the computational indistinguishability of [6, Definition 3.2.2] in the setting of CSLR.
Definition 1 (Computational indistinguishability)
. Two CSLR terms f 1 and f 2 , both of type Bits → TBits, are computationally indistinguishable (written as f 1 f 2 ) if for every term A such that A : Bits → TBits → TBits, every positive polynomial p (SLR-typable of Bits → Bits), and all bitstring w such that |w| ≥ n (for some n ∈ N),
Note that the second parameter of the adversary must be a computation which can be executed several times. If the adversary were of type Bits → Bits → TBits, it would be too weak since the only way to get the second argument from the programs under testing is bind x = f i (w) in A(w, x), where the adversary executes the programs only once and uses the value everywhere.
Examples of PPT functions
Before moving on to develop the logic for reasoning about programs in CSLR, we define some useful PPT functions that will be frequently used in cryptographic constructions.
-The random bitstring generation rs rs rs:
rs rs rs rs rs rs receives a bitstring and returns a uniformly random bitstring of the same length. It can be checked that h rs rs rs : Bits → TBits TBits, hence rs rs rs : Bits → TBits. Some of the type checking procedure is given in Figure 2 h conc conc conc is a purely deterministic, well-typed SLR-function of type Bits → TBits TBits, hence conc conc conc : Bits → Bits Bits. Note that conc conc conc can also be defined as a SLR-term of type Bits Bits → Bits, i.e., it recurs on only one of its argument but it does not matter which one, so we do not distinguish the two forms but only require that one of the two arguments of conc conc conc must be normal (modal). We often abbreviate conc conc conc(u, v) as u•v. Both hd hd hd and tl tl tl are SLR-definable and SLR-typable of type Bits Bits.
-Split function split split split:
where
split split split(x, n) splits the bitstring x into two bitstrings, among which the first one is of the length |n| if |n| ≤ |x| or x otherwise. It can be checked that split split split is SLR-definable and SLR-typable of type Bits Bits → Bits ⊗ Bits. With split split split we can define the prefix and suffix functions:
Both of the two functions are SLR-definable of type Bits Bits → Bits. -Cut function cut cut cut:
cut cut cut def = λx . λn . pref pref pref (x, suff suff suff (x, n)).
cut cut cut(x, n) cuts the right part of length |n| of the bitstring x. We shall often abbreviate it as x − n. cut cut cut is SLR-definable of type Bits Bits → Bits.
The proof system
We present in this section an equational proof system C C C on top of CSLR, through which one can justify the computational indistinguishability between CSLR programs at the syntactic level.
The system C C C has two sets of rules: the first set ( Figure 6 ) are rules for justifying semantic equivalence between CSLR programs (we write e 1 ≡ e 2 if e 1 , e 2 are semantic equivalent), and the second set ( Figure 7 ) are rules for justifying computational indistinguishability.
The first set are standard rules in typed λ-calculi, with axioms for probabilistic computations. Rules in the second set are similar as in the logic of Impagliazzo and Kapron [9] (which we shall refer to as the IK-logic in the sequel), where they also define an equational proof system for the computational indistinguishability based on their own arithmetic model. But here we do not have the EDIT rule for managing bitstrings, as appears internally in their logic, because in our language, there is no primitive operations for editing bitstrings except the two bit constructor B 0 , B 1 . Many bitstring operations are defined as CSLR functions and we have introduced a series of lemmas for bitstring operations (see Section 3.2).
The H-IND rule comes from the frequently used hybrid technique in cryptography: if two complex programs can be transformed into a "small" (polynomial) number of hybrids (relatively simpler programs), where the extreme hybrids are exactly the original programs, then proving the computational indistinguishability of the two original programs can be reduced to proving the computational indistinguishability between neighboring hybrids. The H-IND in our system is slightly different from that in the IK-logic since we do not have the general primitive that returns uniformly a number which is smaller than a polynomial, but the underlying support from the hybrid technique remains there.
Soundness of the system C C C
To show that the system C C C is sound with respect to the set-theoretic semantics of CSLR, we prove the soundness of the two sets of rules.
Axioms:
AX-REFL e ≡ e AX-REC-NIL rec(e1, e2, nil) ≡ e1 AX-REC rec(e1, e2, Be) ≡ e2(e, rec(e1, e2, e)) AX-CASE-NIL case(nil, e , e0, e1 ) ≡ e i = 0, 1 AX-CASE-i case(Bie, e , e0, e1 ) ≡ ei e AX-β (λx.e)e ≡ e[e /x]
AX-BIND-2 bind x = e in val(x) ≡ e AX-BIND-3 bind x = (bind y = e1 in e2) in e3 ≡ bind y = e1 in bind x = e2 in e3
Inference rules:
e ≡ e SYM e ≡ e e ≡ e e ≡ e TRANS e ≡ e ei ≡ e i (i = 1, 2, 3) REC rec(e1, e2, e3) ≡ rec(e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ) ei ≡ e i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) CASE case(e1, e2, e3, e4 ) ≡ case(e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ) e ≡ e ABS λx.e ≡ λxe e1 ≡ e 1 e2 ≡ e 2 APP e1e2 ≡ e 1 e 2 e ≡ e i = 1, 2 PROJ-i proj i e ≡ proj i e e1 ≡ e 1 e2 ≡ e 2 PAIR e1, e2 ≡ e 1 , e 2 e1 ≡ e 1 e2 ≡ e 2 TENSOR e1 ⊗ e2 ≡ e 1 ⊗ e 2 e1 ≡ e 1 e2 ≡ e 2 LET let x ⊗ y = e1 in e2 ≡ let x ⊗ y = e 1 in e 2 e ≡ e VAL val(e) ≡ val(e ) e1 ≡ e 1 e2 ≡ e 2 BIND bind x = e1 in e2 ≡ bind x = e 1 in e 2 Fig. 6 . System C C C rules for program equivalence e1 : Bits → TBits e2 : Bits → TBits e1 ≡ e2 EQUIV e1 e2 e1 e2 e2 e3 TRANS-INDIST e1 e3
x :
n Bits, y : n Bits e : TBits e1 e2 SUB λx . bind y = e1(x) in e λx . bind y = e2(x) in e x :
n Bits, n : n Bits e : TBits λn.e[u/x] is numerical for all bitstring u λx . e[i(x)/n] λx . e[B1i(x)/n] for all canonical polynomial i such that |i| < |p| H-IND λx . e[nil/n] λx . e[p(x)/n] Fig. 7 . System C C C rules for computational indistinguishability Theorem 3 (Soundness of program equivalence rules). If Γ e 1 : τ , Γ e 2 : τ , and e 1 ≡ e 2 is provable in system C C C, then e 1 ρ = e 2 ρ, where ρ ∈ Γ .
Proof. Most rules for semantic equivalence are standard in typed λ-calculus. The probabilistic monad certifies the axioms for computations.
Theorem 4 (Soundness of computational indistinguishablity rules).
If Γ e 1 : Bits → TBits, Γ e 2 : Bits → TBits, and e 1 e 2 is provable in the system C C C, then e 1 and e 2 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. We prove that rules in Figure 7 are sound. The soundness of the rule EQUIV is obvious.
For the rule TRANS-INDIST , let A be an arbitrary (well-typed hence computable in polynomial time) adversary and q be an arbitrary positive polynomial, then we can easily define another polynomial q such that for all bitstring u, |q (u)| = 2|q(u)| (e.g., q def = λx . q(x)•q(x), and clearly it is well typed). Because e 1 e 2 , according Definition 1, there exists some n ∈ N and for any bitstring w such that |w| ≥ n,
Also because e 2 e 3 , there exists another n ∈ N and for any bitstring w such that |w| ≥ n ,
Without losing generality, we suppose that n ≥ n , then for every bitstring w such that |w| ≥ n,
Since p is arbitrary, according to Definition 1, e 1 e 3 .
To prove the soundness of the rules SUB , we assume that there exists an adversary which can computationally distinguish the two terms in the conclusion part, and show that one can also build another adversary which computationally distinguishes the two terms in the premise part. More precisely, for some polynomial p and any integer n, there exists some bitstring w such that |w| ≥ n and
where f 1 and f 2 are the two programs in the conclusion part of the rule SUB . We then build another adversary A :
where f is not free in A and e. According to the set-theoretic semantics,
which is a contradiction of the premise e 1 e 2 . The soundness of the rule H-IND can be proved in a similar way as the proof of TRANS-INDIST. Let A be an arbitrary well-typed adversary and q be an arbitrary positive polynomial. Define another polynomial:
λx.e[Bi(x)/n] for all canonical numeral i such that |i| < |p|, we can find a sufficiently large number m ∈ N such that for all bitstring w whose length is larger than m,
and according to Definition 1, λx.e[nil/n] λx.e[p(x)/n], since q, A are arbitrary.
Useful lemmas for proving cryptographic constructions
We introduce in this section some useful lemmas that will be frequently used in reasoning about cryptographic constructions. Most of the lemmas are about the indistinguishable programs using random bitstring generation. Note that these are not internal rules of the rpoof system, but we shall name and use them as we do with system C C C rules.
Lemma 1. For every bitstring u, the functions λx.split split split(u, x), λx.pref pref pref (u, x), λx.suff suff suff (u, x) and λx.u − x are numerical polynomials.
Proof. We prove only the the function split split split(u) -proofs for all others are similar. We need to prove that, for all bitstrings n, m such that |n| = |m|, split split split(u, n) = split split split(u, m) , or split split split(u, n) ≡ split split split(u, m) according to Theorem 3. The proof is an induction on the length of the argument n. The case where |n| = 0 is clear. When |n| > 0, suppose that n ≡ Bn and m ≡ Bm , then
Lemma 2 (HEAD-TAIL). For all bitstrings b and u such that |b| = 1,
Proof. Both can be easily deduced from their definitions.
Lemma 3 (SPLIT-1).
For all bitstrings u, u , there exist bitstrings
Proof. We prove by the induction on u . Obviously, the lemma holds when u = nil. Consider the induction step:
(by the induction hypothesis, we suppose split split split(u, u ) ≡ u 1 ⊗ u 2 ) By induction hypothesis, |u 2 | = |u| − |u 1 | = |u| − |u |. If |u | = |u|, then |u 2 | = 0, i.e. u 2 ≡ nil, and
Lemma 4 (SPLIT-2). For all bitstrings u and u sch that |u | ≥ |u|,
Proof. Firstly, for every bitstring u,
it holds that for every bitstring u 1 , u 2 such that |u 1 | = |u 2 |, split split split(u, u 1 ) ≡ split split split(u, u 2 ).
For every bitstrings u and u such that |u | = |u|, split split split(u, u ) ≡ u 1 ⊗ u 2 and |u 1 | = |u | by Lemma 3, then |u 2 | = |u| − |u 1 | = 0, hence u 2 ≡ nil, i.e., split split split(u, u ) ≡ u 1 ⊗ nil.
Corollary 1 (PREF).
For all bitstrings u and u such that |u | ≥ |u|,
Proof. For every bitstring u,
and for every bitstring u such that |u | ≥ |u|,
Corollary 2 (SUFF).
Proof. Similar as in Corollary 1.
Lemma 5 (CUT).
Proof. The first assertion:
u − nil ≡ pref pref pref (u, suff suff suff (u, nil)) ≡ pref pref pref (u, u) ≡ u.
The second assertion:
u − u ≡ pref pref pref (u, suff suff suff (u, u )) ≡ pref pref pref (u, nil) ≡ nil.
Lemma 6 (RS-EQUIV).
For every bitstrings u and v such that |u| = |v|, rs rs rs(u) ≡ rs rs rs(v). hence,
Lemma 10 (RS-TAIL). bind x = rs rs rs(Bu) in val(tl tl tl (x)) ≡ rs rs rs(u).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 9.
Lemma 11 (RS-SPLIT). For all bitstrings u and v such that |u| ≥ |v|, bind x = rs rs rs(u) in val(pref pref pref (x, v)) ≡ rs rs rs(pref pref pref (u, v)), bind x = rs rs rs(u) in val(suff suff suff (x, v)) ≡ rs rs rs(suff suff suff (u, v)).
Proof. Proof of the first assertion: bind x = rs rs rs(u) in val(pref pref pref (x, v)) ≡ bind x = rs rs rs(pref pref pref (u, v)•suff suff suff (u, v)) in val(pref pref pref (x, v)) (by the rule RS-EQUIV , since |u| = |pref pref pref (u, v)•suff suff suff (u, v)|) ≡ bind ( x 1 = rs rs rs(pref pref pref (u, v)), x 2 = rs rs rs(suff suff suff (u, v)) ) in val(pref pref pref (x 1 •x 2 , v)) (by the rule RS-CONCAT ) ≡ bind ( x 1 = rs rs rs(pref pref pref (u, v)), x 2 = rs rs rs(suff suff suff (u, v)) ) in val(x 1 ) (pref pref pref (x 1 •x 2 , v) ≡ x 1 as |x 1 | = |pref pref pref (u, v)| = |v|) ≡ rs rs rs(pref pref pref (u, v)).
Similarly one can prove the second assertion.
Lemma 12 (RS-CUT).
For all bitstrings u and u such that |u | ≤ |u|, bind x = rs rs rs(u) in val(x − u ) ≡ rs rs rs(u − u ).
Proof.
bind x = rs rs rs(u) in val(x − u ) ≡ bind x = rs rs rs(u) in val(pref pref pref (x, suff suff suff (x, u ))) ≡ bind x = rs rs rs(u) in val(pref pref pref (x, suff suff suff (u, u ))) (because pref pref pref (x) is a numeral polynomial and |suff suff suff (x, u )| = |suff suff suff (u, u )| since |x| = |u|) ≡ rs rs rs(pref pref pref (u, suff suff suff (u, u ))) (by the rule RS-SPLIT ) ≡ rs rs rs(u − u ) Lemma 13 (RS-NEXT-BIT). For all bitstrings u and i such that |i| < |u|, rs rs rs(pref pref pref (u, Bi)) ≡ rs rs rs(Bpref pref pref (u, i)).
Proof. According to Lemma 3, because |Bi| ≤ |u|, |pref pref pref (u, Bi)| = |Bi| = |i| + 1 = |pref pref pref (u, i)| + 1 = |Bpref pref pref (u, i)|, hence split split split(pref pref pref (u, Bi)) ≡ rs rs rs(Bpref pref pref (u, i)) since λx.split split split(u, x) is a numerical polynomial.
Cryptographic examples
Several cryptographic examples are presented in this section and their proofs of correctness is reformulated in the proof system that we define in the previous section.
Pseudorandom generators
Our first example is verifying, in our proof system, Goldreich and Micali's construction of pseudorandom generator [6] . This example also appears in [9] , but their proof has a subtle flaw (see Section 5 for explanation).
We first reformulate in CSLR the standard definition of pseudorandom generator [6, Definition 3.3.1].
Definition 2 (Pseudorandom Generator).
A pseudorandom generator is a length-sensitive SLR term g : Bits → Bits such that |g(s)| > |s| for every bitstring s and, λx . bind u = rs rs rs(x) in val(g(u)) λx . rs rs rs(g(x)).
If g is a pseudorandom generator, we call |g| its expansion factor. We recall the construction of Goldreich and Micali [6] (reformulated in CSLR): Suppose that g 1 is a PRG with the expansion factor |g 1 |(x) = x + 1, i.e., λx . bind u = rs rs rs(x) in val(g 1 (x)) λx . rs rs rs(Bx).
Let B(x) be the function returning the first bit of g 1 (x), and R(x) returning the rest bits: B def = λx . hd hd hd (g 1 (x)), R def = λx . tl tl tl (g 1 (x)).
Clearly, both B and R are well typed functions (of the same type Bits → Bits). We then define a SLR-function G: G def = λu . λn . rec(nil, λm . λr . r•B(R (u, m)), n),
where the function R is defined as:
R def = λu . λn . rec(u, λm . λr . R(pref pref pref (r, u)), n).
It can also be checked that both G and R are well typed SLR-terms (of type Bits → Bits → Bits).
We first prove the following property about the function G:
Lemma 14. For every bitstring n, λx . bind u = rs rs rs(x) in val(G(u, Bn))
λx . bind ( b = rand, u = rs rs rs(x) ) in val(b •G(u, n) ) .
Proof. Because R def = λx . tl tl tl (g 1 (x)), we can conclude that for every bitstring u, |R(u)| = |u| since |g 1 (u)| = |u| + 1. We then show that for any bitstrings u and n, R (u, n) ≡ R |n| (u). This can be done by induction on |n|: when |n| = 0, i.e., n = nil, R (u, nil) ≡ rec(u, λm . λr . R(pref pref pref (r, u)), nil) ≡ u; when n = Bn for some bitstring n , i.e., |n| = |n | + 1, R (u, Bn ) ≡ rec(u, λm . λr . R(pref pref pref (r, u)), Bn ) ≡ R(pref pref pref (R (u, n ), u)) ≡ R(pref pref pref (R |n | (u), u)) ≡ R(R |n | (u)) (because |R |n | (u)| = |R |n |−1 (u)| = · · · = |u|) ≡ R |n |+1 (u) = R |n| (u).
We next show that for every bitstrings u and n, G(u, Bn) ≡ B(u)•G(R(u), n). This is also proved by induction on |n|: when |n| = 0, i.e., n = nil, ≡ λx . bind u = rs rs rs(x) in val(hd hd hd (g 1 (u))•G(tl tl tl (g 1 (u)), n))
λx . bind u = rs rs rs(Bx) in val(hd hd hd (u)•G(tl tl tl (u), n))
(by the rule SUB and because λx.bind u = rs rs rs(x) in val(g 1 (u)) λx.rs rs rs(Bx)) ≡ λx . bind ( b = rand, u = rs rs rs(x) ) in val(hd hd hd (b•u)•G(tl tl tl (b•u), n)) (by the rule RS-CONCAT ) ≡ λx . bind ( b = rand, u = rs rs rs(x) ) in val(b•G(u, n)).
We next prove that, given a polynomial p, one can use G to construct easily a PRG with the expansion factor |p|, and the proof will be done in the system C C C.
